Abstract. For a finite set of actions and a rich set of fundamentals, consider the rationalizable actions on a universal type space, endowed with the usual product topology. (1) 
Introduction
This paper shows that, if one considers all possible payoff and belief structures, then rationalizability generically leads to a unique solution. Moreover, when there is multiplicity, refining rationalizability implies ruling out some nearby dominancesolvable models as the true model. Formally, consider a finite-player, finite-action game with some unknown payoff parameters. The set A of action profiles is endowed with the discrete topology. Assume that each action can be strictly dominant for some parameter value, e.g., that the domain of possible payoff structures is not restricted a priori. Endow the game with the universal type space T of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) , where T is endowed with the usual product topology of weak convergence. I prove the following.
Main Result. Generically, there exists a unique rationalizable action profile, and it is generically continuous. That is, there exist an open, dense set U ⊂ T and a Date: October 2004. I thank Jonathan Weinstein for long collaborations on the topic; this work is partly built on our joint work, and we had discussed some closely related ideas. I thank Stephen Morris for extensive discussions on the topic while I visited Cowles Foundation; the main ideas of this paper occurred to us during a lunch discussion. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Glenn Ellison, Bart Lipman, and Casey Rothschild for invaluable comments, and Dov Samet and Aviad Heifetz for earlier discussions.
continuous function s * : U → A, such that s * (t) is the unique rationalizable action profile at t for each t ∈ U. In particular, every rationalizable strategy is continuous on the open, dense set U.
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That is, if we exclude a nowhere-dense set of type profiles, then for each remaining type profile, there is a unique rationalizable action profile, and the action profile is given by a continuous function s * . Since a rationalizable strategy profile must agree with s * on the open and dense set U, it must be continuous on U. Continuity of s * means that each type profile in U has an open neighborhood on which s * is constant. This leads to an interesting picture: the universal type space is comprised of a collection of open sets and their boundaries, such that in each of the open sets, a fixed action profile is the unique rationalizable action profile. Multiplicities and discontinuities occur only on the boundaries of these sets, where the unique rationalizable action profile potentially changes. Ubiquity of multiple rationalizable actions in usual game theoretical models suggests that our common knowledge assumptions put our models on these boundaries. This also shows that the nowhere-dense set here is not negligible, as it includes many of the models in economics literature.
What does this mathematical result tell us about economic modeling? For an answer, let us examine the assumptions embedded in the universal type space. In this space, a type is a coherent hierarchy of beliefs about the payoff parameters, where the first-order beliefs are about the parameters, the second-order beliefs are about the first-order beliefs, and so on. The universal type space contains most type spaces as "belief-closed" subspaces (henceforth, models). For example, it contains a family of models in which the players observe the parameters with noise, where the level of noise and the prior beliefs vary across the models, as well as the complete information model with no noise. If we fix a prior and let the size of the noise go to zero, the players' beliefs at each finite order converges to that of complete information. In that case, it becomes difficult for the modeler to distinguish these models from each other in the interim stage, when one can only observe the posterior beliefs (at possibly various orders). The product topology captures this difficulty of identification. In this topology, a sequence of types converge to a fixed type if the beliefs at all orders converge. In particular, the above models converge to that 1 Here, U , the set of all type profiles with unique rationalizable action profile, is open simply because the rationalizability correspondence is upper semicontinuous (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2003) ) and the action space is finite. I show that U is dense, using a result of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and a construction by Weinstein and Yildiz (2004) , whose main idea can be traced back to the seminal works of Rubinstein (1989) and Carlson and van Damme (1993) .
of complete information as the noise vanishes. In the ex ante stage, the modeler can, of course, find the above models quite different; 2 the prior may have substantial impact on strategic behavior even in the presence of strong information. Unfortunately, however, in most applications, the modeler faces the situation only in the interim stage. The ex ante stage is often merely a hypothetical construct. For the following discussion, assume that the modeler can make observations about finite but arbitrarily many orders of beliefs, so that after the observation he knows that the belief at each observed order is in some arbitrarily given open neighborhood.
In the main result, genericity of uniqueness means the following:
(i) the modeler can never rule out the case that each player has a unique rationalizable action and (ii) whenever the players do have unique rationalizable actions, the modeler could make sure that that is the case by making a sufficiently precise observation (by choosing sufficiently small open sets at sufficiently many orders).
Continuity of a strategy means that the modeler can know what the player will play according to the strategy if his observation is sufficiently precise. Then, genericity of continuity and uniqueness implies that the modeler can never rule out the possibility that he could have learned what the players will play according to rationalizability, by making a more precise observation.
Genericity of uniqueness provides a new perspective on refinements of rationalizability (and equilibrium). To expose this, I further show that, given any finite type space and any rationalizable strategy in that type space, one can slightly perturb the players' perceptions about the payoffs to obtain a nearby dominance-solvable model in which the given strategy is uniquely rationalizable. (For each type in the original model, there will be a type in the dominance-solvable model whose beliefs are arbitrarily close to that of the original type for arbitrarily many orders.) We can therefore regard a finite type space as a model that summarizes many indistinguishable situations by abstracting away the details that are used in computing the beliefs at very high orders. By specifying these details, one could make any rationalizable strategy uniquely rationalizable. In the detailed model, one must 2 The identification problem in the ex ante stage can be captured by the "box topology", which requires the belief at all orders to converge uniformly. In this topology, the above models do not converge as the noise vanishes. For, with noise, the limit of kth-order expectations as k → ∞ is the ex ante expected value of parameters (Samet (1998) ). take the unique rationalizable strategy as the only prediction, no matter what refinement of rationalizability (or equilibrium) he believes in. Therefore, when one refines rationalizability by ignoring some rationalizable strategies, he simply ignores the dominance-solvable models that are indistinguishable from the model at hand but lead to the ignored strategies as unique solutions. In that sense, refinement is a selection among payoff and information structures, rather than an epistemic issue.
The last result leads to extensions of some earlier results. Firstly, I extend, in a weaker form, the results of Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) for supermodular games to all finite-action games. For supermodular games of complete information, they showed that any perturbation within a canonical class leads to a dominance-solvable model-except for the degenerate signal values at which the strategies jump. For arbitrary finite-action games with arbitrary payoff and information structures (with possibly infinite type spaces), I show that there exists a perturbation that leads to a nearby dominance-solvable model. The dominance-solvable model will remain so, when further small perturbations are introduced. This suggests that multiplicity will become rare as we allow higher-order uncertainty at all levels. (As we succesively introduce higher-order uncertainty in the form of "small" noise, the domain of dominance-solvability will grow, while the domain of multiplicity will shrink.) Second, extending a discontinuity result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2004) for equilibrium, I obtain a characterization: a rationalizable strategy is continuous at a type that lies in a finite type space if and only if there is a unique rationalizable action for that type. At such a type, either all rationalizable strategies are continuous, or all of them are discontinuous.
Some may find the above discussion misleading. The examples refer to models with a common prior, while the universal type space contains the models without a common prior as well. The above counterintuitive results may be due the latter models. Using a result by Lipman (2003) , I show that all of the above results remain intact if we restrict ourselves to the finite models with common prior. In particular, the nearby dominance-solvable models for the finite type spaces can be taken as part of a larger finite type space with a common prior, and the above characterization of continuity with dominance-solvability remains intact even if we restrict the domain of the strategies to types with a common prior. In contrast, the sufficient conditions for robust equilibrium under a common prior is substantially weaker than dominance-solvability (Kajii and Morris (1995) ).
In the next section I introduce the model and preliminary results. In Section 3, I present the results. The proof of a central lemma is presented in Section 4. Section 4 concludes.
Model
Consider a game with finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, finite set A = A 1 × · · · × A n of action profiles a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), and utility functions u i : Θ × A → R, i ∈ N, where Θ is a compact, complete and separable metric space of payoff-relevant parameters θ, and u i is continuous in θ. The finite set A is endowed with the discrete topology. The game is endowed with the universal type space. A type of a player i is an infinite hierarchy of beliefs
is a probability distribution on Θ, representing the beliefs of i about θ, t
, representing the beliefs of i about θ and the other players' first-order beliefs, and so on. Here, ∆ (X) is the space of all probability distributions on X, endowed with weak* topology. I assume that it is common knowledge that the beliefs are coherent (i.e., each player knows his beliefs and his beliefs at different orders are consistent with each other). The set of all such types are denoted by T i ; T = T 1 × · · · × T n denotes the set of all type profiles t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ), and T −i = Q j6 =i T j is the set of profiles of types t −i for players other than i.
3 Each T i is endowed with the product topology, so that a sequence of types t i,m converges to a type t i , denoted by t i,m → t i , if and only if t k i,m → t k i for each k. A sequence of type profiles t (m) = (t 1,m , . . . , t n,m ) converges to t iff t i,m → t i for each i. For each type t i , let κ t i ∈ ∆ (Θ × T −i ) be the unique probability distribution that represents the beliefs of t i about (θ, t −i ). There is a one-to-one relationship between t i and κ t i , and if
A strategy of a player i is any measurable function s i : T i → A i . Given any type t i and any profile s −i of other players' strategies, π (·|t i , s −i ) ∈ ∆ (Θ × A −i ) denotes the joint distribution of θ and the other players' actions, a −i , induced by t i and s −i . For any correlated mixed strategy profile σ −i , π (·|t i , σ −i ) is similarly defined. For each i ∈ N and for each belief π ∈ ∆ (Θ × A −i ), BR i (π) denotes the set of actions 3 Notation: In general, I write x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (x i , x −i ) ∈ X = X 1 × · · · × X n and
. . , f n (x n )), and for set-valued functions, I write
a i ∈ A i that maximize the expected value of u i (θ, a i , a −i ) under the probability distribution π.
Remark 1. In my formulation, it is common knowledge that the payoffs are given by a fixed continuous function of parameters. This assumption is without loss of generality because we can take a parameter to be simply the function that maps action profiles to the payoff profiles. For example, we can take
A for each i, and let u i (θ, a) = θ i (a) for each (i, a, θ). This model allows all possible payoff functions, and here θ is simply an index for the profile of the payoff functions. This model clearly satisfies the following richness assumption.
Assumption 1 (Richness Assumption). For each i and each a i , there exists θ
That is, the space of possible payoff structures is rich enough so that each action can be strictly dominant for some parameter value. In developing a unified theory, one would want to avoid a priori restrictions on the domain of payoff structures. When there are no such restrictions and the actions represent the strategies in a one-shot, simultaneous-move game, Assumption 1 is automatically satisfied. When actions represent the strategies in a dynamic game, a player will be indifferent between any two strategies that differ only on information sets that are ruled out by the strategies themselves, assuming that the player believes that he does not make any mistake (or does not "tremble") in playing these strategies. Hence, Assumption 1 may appear to rule out all these games. But it is possible that the player thinks that each player may make a mistake at each information set with positive probability, as game theorists typically assume in their analyses of such games. In that case, he will not necessarily be indifferent between those strategies. Indeed, Assumption 1 will be satisfied for a reduced-form representation, if one does not rule out the possibility of such mistakes a priori and allows all payoff vectors at terminal nodes. 
.) The set of all rationalizable actions for player i (with type t i ) is
A strategy profile s : T → A (resp. a strategy s i :
The set of rationalizable strategies is denoted by R i , and
Remark 2. When there is incomplete information, rationalizability can be defined in many different ways, leading to different sets of rationalizable strategies. The interim correlated rationalizability is the weakest interim notion of rationalizability. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2003) show that, for arbitrary type space and independent of whether correlations are allowed, if an action a i is rationalizable for a type with belief hierarchy
Using a weak notion of rationalizability strengthens both positive generic uniqueness and the negative discontinuity results; these results will remain valid under any stronger notion of rationalizability.
Mathematical Definitions and Preliminary Results.
Definition 1 (Genericity). The closure of a set T 0 ⊆ T , denoted by T 0 , is the smallest closed set that contains
each t ∈ T , there exists a sequence of type profiles t (m) ∈ T 0 such that t (m) → t.
A set T 0 is said to be nowhere-dense iff the interior of T 0 is empty, i.e., T 0 does not contain any open set. A statement is said to be generically true if it is true on an open, dense set of type profiles.
An open and dense set T 0 ⊆ T is large in the sense that its complement, T \T 0 , is nowhere-dense. In that case, T \T 0 is simply the boundary of T 0 , denoted by ∂T 0 .
Clearly, topological notions of genericity may widely differ from measure theoretical notions of genericity. Since this paper is about the topological properties of rationalizable strategies, the topological notions seem to be appropriate. (To see how these notions are related, see Oxtoby (1980) .)
Definition 2 (Finite Types, Models). A subset T 0 ⊆ T is said to be belief closed iff
contains finitely many member and t 
The set of all type profiles that comes from a model with a common prior is denoted by T CP A ; formally, T
|T 0 is belief-closed and admits a common prior}. The next result by Lipman (2003) shows that, given any finite model "with full support", one can obtain a nearby finite model that admits a common prior. This is because the common-prior assumption does not put any restriction on finite-order beliefs other than full support (see also Feinberg (2000) ). 
Definition 5 (Continuity). A strategy s i is said to be continuous at t i iff (2.1)
for each sequence of types t i,m . Since A i is endowed with the discrete topology, if s i is continuous at t i , then s i is constant on a neighborhood of t i . A (bounded) correspondence F : T → 2 A is said to be upper-semicontinuous if its graph is closed in the product topology of T × A. Since A is endowed with the discrete topology, F is upper semicontinuous iff each t has a neighborhood η with
Lemma 3 (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2004)). S ∞ is upper-semicontinuous.
Together with the observations in the following lemma, this will provide a main step in the proof of the main result. 
Results
In this section, I analyze the continuity and uniqueness properties of rationalizable strategies. I show that, generically, there exists a unique rationalizable action. Whenever there is a unique rationalizable action for a type, every rationalizable strategy is continuous at that type. For finite types, I show that the converse is also true: a rationalizable strategy is continuous at a finite type if and only if there is a unique rationalizable action for that type. I further show that for any model, there is a perturbation that leads to a dominance-solvable model. Using these results, I then present characterizations for the topologies generated by rationalizable strategies. The next result will be the main tool for this analysis. That is, given any type and any rationalizable action a i for that type, one can find a nearby type for which a i is uniquely rationalizable. Moreover the new type can be found in a dominance-solvable model or in a model with a common prior. Since the proof of this result is somewhat involved, I will present the proof in Section 4, after exploring the important implications of the lemma for this paper.
3.1. Equivalence of continuity and uniqueness. Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, a rationalizable strategy s i ∈ R i is continuous at a finite typet i ∈T i if and only ift i has a unique rationalizable action, i.e., S (by Lemma 5) . ¤ Proposition 1 establishes that, at a finite type, either all rationalizable strategies are continuous, or all of them are discontinuous. The set of finite types can be put into two groups. For the types in one group, the game is "dominance-solvable", and all rationalizable strategies are continuous at these types. For the types in the other group, there are multiple rationalizable actions, and each rationalizable strategy is discontinuous at each type in this group. Since there are typically multiple rationalizable actions, the finite types in applications typically fall into the second group. Assumption 1 is not superfluous; without Assumption 1, some rationalizable strategy may be continuous at a type with multiple rationalizable actions.
Under weaker assumptions, Weinstein and Yildiz (2004) have shown that every equilibrium is discontinuous at a type for which multiple actions survive iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict best reply. Proposition 1 drops the equilibrium and strictness requirements in their conclusion. This extension is important because equilibrium may not exist in general, and in some important games, such as perfect-information games, there are multiple rationalizable actions, but no action survives the elimination process above. The strictness requirement is not binding in generic complete-information games.
Genericity of Uniqueness. Let
be the set of type profiles with unique rationalizable actions. , m) ) = a and s (t (a 0 , m)) = a 0 , where t (a, m) ∈ U a and t (a 0 , m) ∈ U a 0 .
Here, all rationalizable strategies are rendered discontinuous at t by the fact that the generically unique rationalizable theory changes its prescribed behavior at t.
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In summary, Proposition 2 establishes that, if one excludes a nowhere-dense set of types, then there will be a unique unified theory of rational behavior for the remaining types, and it will be continuous with respect to players' beliefs. Discontinuities or multiplicities arise only on the nowhere-dense boundary of the open and dense set U , where the unique unified theory above changes its prescribed behavior for players. Hence, from a theoretical point of view, rationalizability leads to quite robust predictions: given any generic situation, we can know the players' actions if we know their beliefs sufficiently well. We do not need to know their beliefs about the strategies for this prediction; common knowledge of rationality suffices. This is a theoretical robustness, however. The usual practical problems with dominance-solvability and other robustness results do apply here. One may have to specify the players' beliefs with such a high precision that it may be impractical to make any prediction with any reasonable level of precision. For example, a finitelyrepeated prisoners' dilemma game with many repetitions will become dominancesolvable if we introduce small trembles, but it is well known that the equilibrium predictions will dramatically change when the probability of an "irrational" type exceeds a very low threshold, such as 0.001, as shown by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) . Moreover, in application, we typically have a large set of rationalizable actions, suggesting that our common knowledge assumptions lead us to the boundary of U, and the present economic theories are about these nowhere-dense set of types.
Remark 3 (Redundant Types). In some type spaces, there may be distinct types with identical belief hierarchies. In such type spaces with "redundant types", there may be equilibrium strategies that are not rationalizable for the corresponding belief 5 It is also a general possibility that t ∈ ∂U a \ ∪ a 0 6 =a ∂U Remark 4 (Epistemic Types). In a strategic situation, a player's beliefs can be put into two groups: the beliefs regarding the payoffs, called Harsanyi type, and the beliefs regarding the payers' actions, called epistemic type. In the traditional methodology, pioneered by Harsanyi, one specifies the former beliefs as parts of the problem and infers the latter beliefs, as parts of the solution, from the former using rationality postulates. In traditional type spaces, there are often a multitude of epistemic types consistent with a given Harsanyi type and rationality. In epistemic literature, the distinction between these two types has been blurred. Proposition 2 establishes that there is indeed a unique epistemic type for a given generic Harsanyi type if we assume that players are rational throughout the model. Hence, under common knowledge of rationality, generically, there is no distinction between Harsanyi types and epistemic types, and a player's Harsanyi type uniquely determines both the decision problem and its solution.
Remark 5 (Unified Theories). A strategy profile in this paper simultaneously describes an outcome for every model embedded in the universal type space. It can then be regarded as a unified theory. Proposition 2 implies that, if we assume common knowledge of rationality, then we can have only one unified theory for generic cases, and each of his unified theories will be continuous (prescribing the same behavior for indistinguishable models) at generic type profiles. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Govindan and Wilson (2004) seek equilibrium refinements that depend only on the reduced-form representation and are independent to certain "irrelevant transformations," including the introduction of mixed strategies as pure strategies, a transformation that is ruled out here by the richness assumption. I take a complementary approach to the same conceptual problem they have addressed. Towards a unified theory of games, they focus on developing a uniform equilibrium refinement, while I show that generically there is only one such theory.
3.3.
Nearby dominance-solvable models. Since U is dense, for any usual game with a large set of rationalizable strategy profiles, there is a model such that if a player's interim beliefs and payoffs are similar to that of a player in the original game, then he has a unique rationalizable action. The game is dominance-solvable from this player's point of view. In that sense, one can find "dominance-solvable" games nearby any economic model, although it may be difficult to describe the belief structures in these games. I will now show that one can indeed find a nearby dominance-solvable model in the usual sense; this model admits a common prior if the original model is finite. Since each T t,m is dominance-solvable, so is T m . For each t ∈ T 0 , τ (t, m) ∈ T m . ¤ Proposition 3 states that, given any model, we can perturb the model by introducing a small noise in players' perceptions of the payoffs in such a way that the new model is dominance-solvable. Moreover, since U is open, the perturbed model will remain dominance-solvable when we introduce new small perturbations. The next result states that, when the original type space is finite, the dominance-solvable model can be taken to be part of a model that admits a common prior with full support. This result does not rule out the possibility that some far away types in the common-prior model have multiple rationalizable actions. (This is rather due to the method of proof.) Moreover, we can do this for each rationalizable strategy profile s T 0 in the finite model, so that s T 0 is the unique rationalizable strategy profile in the perturbed model. 
Proof. By Lemma 5, for each t ∈ T 0 and m, there exists a finite, dominance-solvable model T t,s T 0 ,m with τ (t, s T 0 , m) ∈ T t,s T 0 ,m as in the proposition. As in the proof of
whenever m >m for somem. Since T 0 is finite,m can be chosen uniformly for all types, so that τ (·, s T 0 , m) is one-to-one for m >m. (Since we can change the index m, we can assume that τ (·, s T 0 , m) is one-to-one for all m without loss of generality.)
Since T s T 0 ,m is finite, by Lemma 9 in the Appendix, for each integer k, there exist a finite modelT m,k that admits a common prior and a one-to-one mapping
Consider an arbitrary complete-information game with a fixed payoff parameterθ. For arbitrary > 0 and arbitrary natural number k, we can find a finite, dominance-solvable type spaceT =T 1 × · · · ×T n with t i ∈T i such that t i assigns at least probability 1 − to η = n θ|d ³ θ,θ´< o , where d is the metric on Θ, at least probability 1 − to the types who assigns at least probability 1 − to η, and so on, up to the order k. Any rationalizable action can be made uniquely rationalizable by some perturbation.
3.4. Strategic Equivalence and Strategic Topologies. Now, I will use the previous results to characterize the strategies under which the rationalizability correspondence and the rationalizable strategies are continuous. 6 I will show that these topologies are closely related to the product topology. 6 A correspondence F : T → 2 A is lower semicontinuous iff for each a ∈ F [t] and each sequence Fix a player i. Define
Under Assumption 1, by Lemma 3, each U a i is open, and by Proposition 2, M i is nowhere-dense, consisting of the boundaries ∂U a i of open sets U a i . Each strategic topology above will be generated by the sets U a i and some partition of M i . In a way, the latter partition will be formed by partitions of the boundaries ∂U a i .
Let T S i be the topology on T i generated by the rationalizability correspondence; T S i is the smallest topology on T i with respect to which S ∞ i is continuous. T S i is the smallest topology that contains all the sets of the form
Clearly, the set P
is the set of all sets that can be written as the union of some sets in P S i and the empty set. If Proof. Define
Since S ∞ i is upper-semicontinuous, C a i is closed. Let T i be the smallest topology that contains both C a i and T i \C a i for each a i . By definition, for each a i , be the topology generated by rationalizable strategies s i ∈ R i , so that T
SS i
is the smallest topology on T i with respect to which all rationalizable strategies are continuous. It is the smallest topology that contains all the sets
When there are two distinct rationalizable actions a i , a
is generated by the open sets U a i , a i ∈ A i , and the discrete topology on their boundaries. This topology is closely related to the following strong notion of strategic equivalence: t i and t 0 i are said to be strongly, strategically equivalent iff
When two types are equivalent in this sense, the players treat these types equivalently under any rationalizable theory. If they are not equivalent, then they will be treated differently by some rationalizable strategy. Let P for some a i , and a type t i ∈ ∂U a i is strategically equivalent only to itself. T
is generated by open sets U a i and the discrete topology on their boundaries.
Strong strategic equivalence is a stringent condition. As the opposite benchmark, consider the weakest form of strategic equivalence: types t i and t 0 i are said to be weakly strategically equivalent iff there exists a rationalizable strategy s i with
When two types are not weakly strategically equivalent, they are treated differently under every rationalizable theory. The next result shows that this notion of strategic equivalence is also closely related to the closed sets U a i that only intersect each other on their boundaries with respect to the product topology: 
Proof of Lemma 5
Now, I will prove Lemma 5. A substantial part of the proof utilizes the following stronger notion of rationalizability, used also by Weinstein and Yildiz (2004) .
be the set of all strictly rationalizable actions for t i . Notice that an action is eliminated if it is not a strict best-response to any belief on the remaining strategies of the other players. Clearly,
] may be empty. 7 Finally,
given any belief-closed T 0 , consider any family
] is a strict best reply to a belief of t i on functions f :
The proof of Lemma 5 has three main steps, which are presented as the following three lemmas. The first step (namely, Lemma 6) shows that, when we focus on strictly rationalizable strategies and do not require a common prior, Lemma 5 is true for each t i ∈T i . The second step (namely, Lemma 7) will state that for any finite type and any rationalizable action, there is a nearby finite type for which the action is strictly rationalizable. Combining these two steps immediately yields Lemma 5 without a common prior. Finally, using the result of Lipman (2003), namely Lemma 2, and the second step one more time, one can show that the common-prior requirement can also be met (as stated in Lemma 9).
The following lemma is similar to the main result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2004) .
, one can change the beliefs at order k + 1 and higher so that a i is played by the new type in equilibrium. The lemma states that one can indeed make a i the only member of S for the new typet i . To prove this lemma, I use their construction but make sure that the new typet i assigns positive probability only on types t −i that come from finite models that are solved after k rounds of iterated dominance (i.e., S k is singleton-valued on these models). In that case, I show thatt i also comes from a finite model that is solved after k + 1 rounds of iterated dominance.
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 1, for each i, k, for eacht i ∈T i , and for each Proof. For k = 0, lett be the type profile according to which it is common knowledge that each j assigns probability 1 to {θ = θ a j }, where θ a j is as defined in Assumption 7 One can show that, if
for each (i, a, θ), then W ∞ is empty only on category 1 set, i.e., union of countably many nowheredense sets. ¢ are the lower and higher-order beliefs, respectively. Let L = {l|∃h : (l, h) ∈ T −i }. The inductive hypothesis is that for each finite t −i = (l, h) and each a −i ∈ W k−1
and
where
the probability distribution induced on Θ×T −i by the mapping µ and the probability distribution
is finite, µ is measurable, and κt i is well-defined. Since µ leaves (θ, l) intact, the first k orders of beliefs (about (θ, l)) are identical undert i andt i :
where the last equality is by definition of P
for each t −i , the distribution induced by κt i and f on Θ × L × A −i is uniquely given by
where γ : (θ, l, h) 7 → (θ, l, f (θ, l, h)), and the last equality is due to the fact that µ 
Conclusion
Usual game theoretical models typically have a multitude of rationalizable actions. The predictions of these models then crucially depend on the model's assumptions about the players' beliefs-except for the few predictions that are true for all rationalizable strategies. The multiplicity may be, however, a property of the present models, rather than a property of rational behavior. Indeed, theoretically, rationalizability generically leads to quite robust predictions: there exists a unique rationalizable outcome, and it is continuous with respect to the players' beliefs.
The finite models accomplish what one would expect from a model. Each of them summarizes dominance-solvable situations by abstracting away from the details that would have mattered mostly for computing the beliefs at very high orders. By specifying these details appropriately, any rationalizable strategy could have been made uniquely rationalizable. But then, refining rationalizability tantamount to ruling out these nearby models as the true model. In that case, when refining rationalizability, a researcher ought to explain why he can rule out those nearby payoff and information structures that are nearly indistinguishable from his model at the interim stage, rather than providing epistemic arguments for the refinement.
